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Abstract 
One of the overarching goals of international large-scale assessments (ILSA) is to inform public 
discourse about the quality of education different countries. To fulfill this function, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), for example, raises 
awareness of the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) results through different 
forms of traditional and social media (e.g., press releases and other activities under the slogan 
PISA Day). Scholars have responded to the rapid growth of ILSA by examining public discourse 
through newspapers articles, policy documents, and other outlets. However, we know very little 
about whether and to what extent the general public is actually affected by PISA results. This 
article expands the range of stakeholders that engage with PISA by exploring public opinion. 
Specifically, the study uses data regarding public trust in education from the 2011 wave of the 
International Social Survey Program (ISSP). Drawing on survey data from 30 countries and 
Hierarchical Linear Models (HLM), the study shows that PISA ranking have a significant effect 
on public perceptions. After taking into account gross domestic product (GDP), we find that in 
high performing countries the general public expresses higher levels of confidence in the 
education system. We discuss these patterns in the context of growing politization of education 
policy making and the use of ILSA as evidence.  
 






Following the rapid growth of country participation in international large-scale assessments 
(ILSA), there is a great interest in the implications of these assessments for education policy 
(Meyer & Benavot, 2013; Wiseman, 2010). After all, in their current configuration, ILSA are 
designed to inform the work of policy makers (Howie & Plomp, 2005; Pizmony-Levy, 2014) and 
to “unsettle complacency in education policy terms within participating nations” (Lingard, 2016, 
615). Indeed, leaders of international organizations responsible for ILSA—the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International Association for the 
Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA)—have recognized the importance of infusing 
ILSA reports into the public sphere as a mechanism for policy change (Schleicher, 2006; 
Wagemaker, 2004). 
Scholars often draw on media coverage of ILSA reports as a “window” into the impact of 
ILSA on education policy and to the extent to which various stakeholders interpret these reports 
to advance their causes (Martens & Niemann, 2013; Pons, 2011; Takayama, 2007, 2008; 
Yasukawa, Hamilton, & Evans, 2017). However, we know very little about public reactions to 
ILSA (Fladmoe, 2012; Morgan & Poppe, 2012; Pizmony-Levy, 2017a). For our purpose, we 
define “public opinion” as opinions concerning social or governmental matters rather than on 
private matters (such as one’s favorite TV show; Clawson & Oxley, 2013). It comprises of 
opinions, attitudes, preferences, beliefs, and values. These opinions are held by individuals in 
society, but they become public through technical practices such as standardized representative 
surveys (Perrin & McFarland, 2011).  
This article focuses on one specific aspect of public opinion: confidence in social 
institutions. Also known as social contract trust, institutional confidence is the expectation of 
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appropriate behavior based on the norms of that institution. The public, for example, generally 
trusts the education system in a given country will do its utmost to educate children and prepare 
them to be contributing members of society. Institutional confidence is the basis of “taken for 
granted” aspects of social interaction, and a necessary ingredient for cooperative actions and 
foundation for social capital (Coleman 1988, 1990). 
Understanding public opinion towards education is important for at least three reasons. 
First, social institutions—such as education—are dependent upon public support for legitimacy 
(Jacobsen, Saultz, & Snyder, 2013; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Public confidence/trust is necessary 
for political leaders to initiate and implement policies that involve allocation of resources to 
attain societal goals (see review: Chanley, Rudolph & Rahn, 2000). Second, public opinion is an 
important factor in the development of policy. In their Advocacy Collation Framework, Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith (1999) argue that changes in public opinion represent external events that are 
critical prerequisites to major policy change. The premise of this argument is that public opinion 
can alter general spending priorities and perceived seriousness of various problems (Berkman & 
Plutzer, 2005). The relative stability of public opinion is also seen as a key mechanism in the 
path dependency of social policy because it signals to policy makers what constituents expect 
(Brooks & Manza 2006; Burstein, 1998). Third, the overall goal of ILSA is to inform educational 
stakeholders (Howie & Plomp, 2005). The conceptual framework for the Program for 
International Student Assessment (PISA), for example, called for “solid internationally 
comparable evidence of educational outcomes” that would address information gaps among 
policy makers and the general public (OECD, 1999). The question remains whether the release 
of PISA results affected public opinion towards education. If national performance on ILSA 
affects confidence and trust in education, it could erode support for public spending in education 
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and generate legitimacy (and manufacture demand) for educational reforms that challenge public 
education. 
This study investigates the relationship between national performance on PISA and 
public confidence in education across 30 countries in 2011. Our analyses examine a set of four 
different measures of performance for each PISA domain (mathematics, science, and reading). 
This set of measures includes country average score, relative position of the country average 
score to the OECD average, country ranking, and ranking-based grouping (top 10, 11-20, and 
below 20). Using Hierarchical Linear Models (HLM) with data from the International Social 
Survey Program (ISSP), this study demonstrates that performance on PISA is important for 
public confidence in education. We conclude with a call for more research on the link between 
ILSA and public opinion.  
Literature Review 
Public confidence in education 
The literature on confidence in education is limited (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Fladmoe, 2012; Guppy 
& Davies, 1999; Jacobson, 2009; Klugman & Xu, 2008; Loveless, 1997; Newton & Norris, 
2000; Lipset & Schneider, 1987; Lyons & Lowery, 1986; Weiler, 1983). While there are slight 
differences between these studies in terms of focus and time period, they generally converge on 
one key point. They all provide evidence of a steady erosion of public confidence in education. 
Jacobsen (2009) and Klugman and Xu (2008), for example, show a dramatic reduction in the 
share of respondents in the United States who have a “great deal” of confidence in public schools 
over time.  
There is also consensus among scholars regarding the importance or implications of 
studying confidence in education. For example, Loveless (1997), Guppy and Davies (1999), and 
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Jacobsen (2009) all posit that confidence in education has a strong impact on public behavior. 
Jacobsen and her colleagues (2013) contend that public schools are particularly reliant on public 
support as they derive legitimacy and funding from the electorate. Coleman (1990) also contends 
that decline in confidence in public education has led to voters defeating bond measures and tax 
increases that constrain public schools’ ability to function and lead to the increased use of private 
schools. Finally, Coleman (1990) suggests that when trust is withdrawn from one arena (e.g. 
public schools) it is frequently placed in another (e.g. private schools or charter schools). 
Moreover, dissatisfaction or lack of trust with public services often leads to citizen action which 
often manifests itself as “exit” or “voice” (Jacobsen, 2009; James & Moseley, 2014).  
Exit refers to families or individuals opting to leave a school and seeking educational 
alternatives such as private schooling or charter schools (Jacobsen, 2009). Performance 
indicators can prove integral to decision-making and choice to exit one institution and enter 
another (James & John, 2007). Voice, on the other hand, describes the process in which 
individuals act together to express their dissatisfaction with a service or institution through 
lobbying, petitioning, or protest (Jacobsen, 2009; James & John, 2007; James & Moseley, 2014). 
The notions of exit and voice are important to mention when discussing confidence in education 
systems. Lack of confidence in public education can lead parents to “exit” their students and 
enroll them in privatized education systems, potentially damaging the public education system. 
(Jacobsen, 2009). Lack of confidence in the education system can also bring about “voice” as 
people take a stand and advocate for changes to be made to alter the system (Jacobsen, 2009). 
Whether or not parents “exit” their students or “voice” their concerns are generally thought to be 
related to information of their education system and this usually comes in the form of 
performance data (more below).  
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Another reason confidence in education is compelling and meaningful to study lies in the 
notion that public confidence has long served as a thermostat for driving reform (Klugman & Xu, 
2008; Guppy & Davies, 1999; Loveless, 1997). According to Klugman and Xu (2008), declining 
levels of confidence in education in the United States has led to support or lack of support for 
various institutional and organizational reforms conceived to address school failures. Similarly, 
in their study of confidence in education in Canada, Guppy and Davies (1999) attribute support 
for educational reform initiatives to a lack of confidence in public schooling. Here, confidence in 
education is likely seen as a measure of school quality and performance; reform is regarded as a 
solution to improve these areas.  It should be noted that literature on public confidence/trust in 
education is also limited by the fact that most if not all research published in English on this 
topic is situated one country, generally the United States, Canada, or the UK (an exception is 
Fladmoe, 2012).1 This study hopes to add to the literature by looking at a multinational sample 
and roles the variables mentioned above play in this sample. 
Scholars have documented the role of individual-level characteristics on public 
confidence in education. Many agree that there is an inverse relationship between education 
attainment and confidence in education (Clawson & Oxley, 2012; Klugman & Xu, 2008; Guppy 
& Davies, 1999). However, there are mixed findings with respect to other variables. Klugman 
and Xu (2008) find that people with higher incomes and who live in urban settings are all less 
likely to express confidence in education. Bali (2016) had similar findings, showing people who 
live in urban communities had lower confidence in schools than people in non-urban 
communities. However, Guppy and Davies (1999) found no significant relationship between 
confidence and income, age, or having children at home. Loveless (1997) and Bali (2016) 
																																								 																				
1	Our literature review is limited to studies published in English. It is very likely that additional 
studies on public opinion towards education are published in other languages. 	
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contradict Guppy and Davies (1999) by asserting that people with children in school tend to have 
more confidence in the schools. Lastly, employment status has been shown to have a relationship 
to confidence in education. People who are unemployed tend to have more confidence in 
education than people who employed. Thus we will control for age, gender, level of education, 
income, community, having children in school, and employment status. We posit that beyond 
these individual factors information about performance of schools will also impact public 
confidence in education. 
Cues, performance data, PISA, and the media 
Information is integral to democratic governance and enabling citizens to exert some level of 
control over the government and public institutions—like education (James, 2010; James & 
John, 2007). That being said, citizens rarely have complete knowledge about political issues or 
the performance of public institutions, nor do they have much of an incentive to become 
informed (James, 2010; James & John, 2007).2 Frequently issues regarding the performance of 
public institutions—like schools—are complex and people do not have the time nor the 
bandwidth to fully explore data about these institutions (James, 2010, 2011; James & John, 2007; 
James & Moseley, 2014; Soroka, 2006). As a result, citizens tend to use information shortcuts or 
cues to “economize on information” and develop their views, thus overcoming the demands 
associated with being fully informed about the performance of public institutions (James, 2010, 
2011; James & John, 2007; James & Moseley, 2014).  
Citizens receive cues about the performance public institutions from personal experience, 
word-of-mouth, and the media (Coleman, 1990; James & Moseley, 2014). These cues often 
																																								 																				
2	Citizens vary in their motivations to become informed on political issues or the performance of 
public institutions. Parents of school-age children, for example, may be more interested than 
others in the performance of schools and the overall education system when they make decisions 
about their children’s education. 
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come in the form of summary performance data or data that reports on the absolute or relative 
performance of an institution. Studies of media effects have consistently pointed to the fact that 
sources and presentation of performance data affect its reception by the population (James, 
2010). People will be less inclined to trust information and performance that comes from 
politicians or public institutions because they believe these actors are more likely to misrepresent 
the data (James, 2010). As a result, people often use various media outlets as arbiters of 
performance data regarding public institutions (Colman, 1990; James & Moseley, 2014). And 
more and more the media is using the results of ILSA like PISA to evaluate the performance of 
education systems. 
Over the last decade PISA become increasingly popular in the media. It fuels education 
debates, and some argue that it has an impact on governance of the education system in many 
countries (Pons, 2011; Takayama, 2007, 2008). Several scholars have examined the discourse 
around PISA results and how it is received by the media (Dixon et al., 2013; Figazzolo, 2009; 
Stack, 2007; Steiner-Khamsi, 2003; Takayama, 2010). They have found that the media tend to 
endorse results with little critique (Stack, 2007), be influenced by shifts in political and social 
conditions (Takayama, 2007, 2008), focus on negative reactions (Dixon et al., 2013), provide 
little background about PISA results and what they mean (Pizmony-Levy, 2017b), and focus on 
international rankings more than anything else (Pizmony-Levy, 2017b; Pons, 2011). Some 
scholars have indicated that increased media attention to PISA results has influenced public 
opinion regarding education, but few have offered empirical evidence for such arguments 
(Fladmoe, 2012). Pizmony-Levy (2017a) found that people in the United States and Israel tend to 
be misinformed about PISA results. Moreover, recent studies examining PISA’s relation to 
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public discourse are limited by the fact that they draw on qualitative analysis of samples of 
newspaper articles and thus are limited in their generalizability.  
Frequently, it matters less about what data, like the PISA results, are reported rather than 
how it is reported. Studies have found that information cues about relative performance are more 
helpful than information about absolute performance because relative performance gives people 
a benchmark to make their judgements while absolute performance can seem abstract (James, 
2010). We will examine this by including various presentations of ranking PISA results in our 
models. The effects of public performance data on citizens’ perceptions have not been fully 
addressed by the literature and need more investigation (James, 2010; James & Moseley, 2014). 
Moreover, scant research has investigated how performance information affects confidence in 
public institutions at the international level. 
Theoretical Framework  
We draw on two different theories for our framework: Newton and Norris’ (2000) institutional 
performance model and the James and Moseley’s (2014) nascent performance information 
theory. Newton and Norris’ (2000) institutional performance model posits that people form trust 
in public institutions because institutions perform well or that people lose trust them when they 
perform poorly. They set this in contrast to two competing theories on how people come to trust 
public institutions. One alternate theory is the socio-psychological explanation: the theory that 
people’s trust in institutions is a part of their personality—i.e., they have a trusting disposition. 
The other is the socio-cultural model of trust that contends that peoples’ trust in institutions is a 
product of their life experience and socialization. In other words, these theories focus on 
individual-level characteristics to explain variation in confidence in public institutions. In this 
study we address these theories by including several individual-level variables in the models.   
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The incipient performance information theory suggests that public performance 
information about institutions will have an effect on confidence and the behavior of citizens 
towards those institutions (James & Moseley, 2014). The two differ slightly in that the latter is 
focused more on the impact of public performance information while the former has a broader 
understanding of how people garner information about performance. Moreover, the institutional 
performance model is set in contrast to other theories about how people form trust. Both theories 
provide a useful lens to examine the relationship between PISA results and public confidence in 
education systems. We expect to find that people’s confidence in education will have a positive 
relationship with their country performance on PISA.  
For the purpose of this study we use country performance on PISA as a proxy for the 
potential sentiments spread by policy makers and the media about the education system. We 
assume that in high preforming countries, overall, policy makers and the media will have less 
opportunity to interpret the results in a negative fashion. Similarly, we assume that in low 
preforming countries, overall, policy makers and the media will have more opportunity to use 
PISA results to scandalize the education system. As for countries that show an unexceptional 
performance (neither high nor low), we assume that policy makers and the media will have more 
flexibility in interpreting and framing the results. We recognize that public opinion towards 
education is not directly shaped by PISA performance; rather it is indirectly influenced by PISA 
performance as the scores and rankings create the opportunity to shape the portrayal of the 






Data & Methods 
Sample 
Data for this study came from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), a collaboration 
conducting standardized, comparable, nationally representative surveys (ISSP, 2017). Founded 
in 1984, the ISSP comprises of research organizations such as universities, academic 
organizations, and survey agencies; each organization represents one nation and funds all of its 
own costs (Smith, 2009). The ISSP does not provide financial support for conducting national 
surveys and has no central funds for organizational or methodological tasks (ISSP, 2017). By 
now, the ISSP has delivered a series of cross-national surveys of adult respondents aged 18 and 
older on myriad social science topics, including environment, family and changing gender roles, 
religion, role of government, social inequality, and work orientation. 
The 2011 ISSP module (“Health and Health Care”) included measures of respondents’ 
evaluation of health care system in their country, personal health, and access to health insurance. 
For the purpose of comparison, the survey also included measures of respondents’ evaluation of 
the education system. The 2011 ISSP module was conducted in 32 countries. The average 
response rate was 54.3% (Gendall, 2013). We restrict our analysis to the 30 countries that 
participated in the 2009 cycle of PISA. After listwise deletion, our final sample included 42,331 
individuals from Australia, Belgium (Flanders and Wallonia), Bulgaria, Chile, China, Chinese 
Taipei, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (East and West), Israel 
(Jewish and Arab descent), Italy, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, and the United States.  
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Nation-level data are drawn from the OECD Report titled PISA 2009 Results: What 
Students Know and Can Do. The report presents detailed information about student performance 
in reading, mathematics and science, including average scores, ranking, differences within 
countries (e.g., based on gender), and differences between countries. Following the public 
release of the report in December 2010, media outlets in various countries published news stories 
about student performance in PISA (see discussion above). We use PISA because researchers 
posit that the source of performance information of public institutions, like schools, has an effect 
on how it is received. Public performance information that comes from independent agents or 
bodies seem to bridge partisan divides and have similar effects on citizens of all political 
leanings (James, 2010; James & Moseley, 2014). One example of an ostensibly independent 
agent is the OECD and it has made large strides in creating performance measurement systems, 
like PISA, that are intended for consumption by citizens and policy makers alike (James & John, 
2007). Nation-level data are also drawn from reports by the World Bank (WB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), which are publicly available sources that provide aggregate 
nation-level data about economic development. 
Dependent variable 
The ISSP dataset contained one measure that assessed confidence in the education system. 
Respondents were asked, “In general, how much confidence do you have in the educational 
system in [country].” Respondents were asked to rate their confidence on a five-point scale 
ranging from 1 “complete confidence” to 5 “no confidence at all”. For ease of interpretation, we 
reversed the coding of this variable so that a higher score indicates higher confidence. 
Country-level independent variables 
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The central hypothesis of this paper concerns the relationship between student performance in 
PISA 2009 and confidence in education. We decided to use PISA because the number of 
countries and systems participating in PISA is higher than in any other ILSA. Moreover, the fact 
that PISA is conducted by the OECD gives it more importance among policy makers and the 
media. We decided to use the 2009 cycle because it was the last ILSA released before the 
administration of the ISSP module in 2011. 
For each of the PISA domains—reading, math, and science—we generated four measures 
of performance. The first measure is country average score, which is reported on a scale of 0 to 
1000 (Most scores fall between 200 and 800). In addition to scores, we also generated measures 
that frame student performance in a comparative or relational perspective. The second measure is 
the relative position of the country average score to the OECD average. This information was 
coded as a trichotomous variable: (1) statistically significant above the OECD average, (2) not 
statistically different than the OECD average; (3) statistically significant below the OECD 
average. The next two measures focus on rank order of countries. Scholars noted that rankings 
are often what is reported and discussed in the media (Pons, 2011; Pizmony-Levy, 2017b), 
therefore they may have a larger impact on confidence than test scores. The third measure is the 
country ranking. The fourth measure is simplified country ranking. This information was coded 
as a trichotomous variable: (1) top ten countries in terms of ranking, (2) countries ranked 11-20, 
and (3) countries ranked 21 or below. 
Country-level controls 
We examine country-level controls that previous research links with trust/confidence in 
institutions. Because previous research suggests that economic development is important to the 
creation of trust (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Freitag & Bühlmann, 2009; Paxton, 2007), we control 
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for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, logged. The countries in the sample do vary in 
their GDP per capita, but this variation is lower than we would find in the large population of 
countries.  
Scholars have noted a difference in institutional trust in more collectivist societies as 
opposed to more individualistic societies. For example, Helgesen (2006) found there were 
distinctly higher levels of trust in Denmark, Sweden, and Finland compared to South Korea and 
Japan. Huff and Kelly (2003) find that people from collectivist Asian countries tend to have 
lower levels of general trust compared to people in the individualistic U.S. Thus, we use a 
dummy variable for the four Asian countries included in the ISSP data: China, Chinese Taipei, 
Japan, and Korea (1 = yes, 0 = no).  
Individual-level controls 
Models control for individual characteristics that previous research identifies as relevant for 
confidence in public institutions. Gender is measured as a dummy variable (1 = woman, 0 = 
man). Age and age-squared are measured in years. Education is based on self-reported highest 
completed education level; we use a series of three dummies: less than secondary degree 
(reference category), secondary degree, and university degree or higher. Labor market status is 
captured in a series of three dummies: employed, unemployed, and not in labor force (i.e., 
students, apprentice or trainee, permanently sick or with disability, retired, and domestic work). 
We include relative income based on country-specific z-scores, which allow for international 
comparison without currency conversion. Parental status is measured as a dummy variable (1 = 
at least one child in the household, 0 = no children in the household). Community type is 
measured as a series of three dummies: urban, suburb and town, and rural. Taken together, these 
characteristics capture different aspects of the socio-psychological and socio-cultural expiations 
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(Newton & Norris, 2000) for the formation of confidence in public institutions. Table 1 presents 
definitions, metrics, and descriptive statistics for all variables in the study. 
Table 1 about here 
Analysis 
The ISSP dataset is hierarchically organized with individuals nested within countries, and 
information at the both the individual level and the country level is used to determine trust in the 
educational system. The clustering of individuals within countries violates assumptions of the 
ordinary least square regression (OLS). Therefore, we use HLM technique that simultaneously 
estimates individual and country-level effects. Specifically, we estimate random intercept 
models, which can be expressed as two equations (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). First, the level of 
trust in educational system for the ith individual in the jth country is a function of country 
intercepts (β0j), a set of individual-level fixed effects (βXij), and an error term (rij):  
Equation #1:  Yij = β0j + βXij + rij 
Second, each country intercept (β0j) is estimated as a function of an intercept (γ00), a set of 
country-level variables (γCj), and an error term (u0j): 
Equation #2:  β0j = γ00 + γCj + u0j 
We examine a series of models for each PISA domain (reading, math, and science). Our strategy 
is to comprehensively examine the effects of different forms of student performance in PISA on 
confidence in educational system. All models include controls for individual-level and country-







Before discussing multilevel models, we consider country-level descriptive patterns (Table 2). 
Finland shows the highest level of confidence in educational system (M=3.93; SD=.65), where 
close to four-fifths of respondents (78.9 percent) say they have a great deal of confidence or 
complete confidence (the second highest and highest response categories on the item 
respectively) in the educational system (63.2 percent and 15.7 percent, respectively). Other 
countries with high levels of confidence in educational system are Norway, Denmark, China, and 
Switzerland. Chinese Taipei shows the lowest level of confidence in educational system 
(M=2.52; SD=.99), where less than one-fifth of respondents (16.2 percent) say they have a great 
deal of confidence or complete confidence in the educational system (14.4 percent and 1.8 
percent, respectively). Other countries with low levels of confidence in educational system are 
Chile, Japan, Korea, and Poland. 
Table 2 about here 
In addition to descriptive patterns, we also examine bivariate correlations between 
country-level confidence in educational system and performance in PISA 2009. Across all three 
PISA domains, the correlation between attitudes and country average PISA score is positive and 
significant (math: r = .33, p<.05; science: r = .29, p<.05; reading: r = .32, p<.05). We found a 
similar pattern—but reversed in direction—for the correlation between attitudes and country 
ranking in PISA (math: r = -.35, p<.05; science: r = -.22, p<.05; reading: r = -.31, p<.05). In 
other words, countries that perform well on PISA also show high levels of confidence in 
educational system.3 
																																								 																				
3	We also examine bivariate correlations between country-level variation in confidence in 
educational system and performance in PISA 2009. Across all three PISA domains, the 
correlation between the variation in attitudes (i.e., standard deviation) and country average PISA 
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HLM Models with Performance in Mathematics   
Table 3 presents HLM models of confidence in educational system and tests the effect of 
national performance on PISA in mathematics across all 30 countries. We initially estimated the 
unconditional model, which does not include any independent variables (not reported). The 
model illustrated that confidence in educational system vary significantly across the 30 countries. 
The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC), suggested that 13.2 percent of the variation in 
confidence in educational system is associated with differences between countries. This finding 
substantiates the application of HLM models. 
Table 3 about here 
Model 1 introduces all the individual-level variables. Except for income, all variables 
have a significant relationship to confidence in the education system.4 Across countries, women 
show more confidence in educational system. Although the relationship is significant, the 
coefficient is relatively small (b=.028, p<.01). Age shows a U-shaped and statistically significant 
relationship with confidence in educational system (see negative coefficient for age and the 
positive coefficient for age squared). The inflection point in the estimates is reached at 45. 
Alternative specifications of the variable age (e.g., age groups) produce similar patterns. Parents 
show more confidence in educational system (b=.081, p<.001) than people without children. 
Respondents with higher levels of education show less confidence in educational system. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
score is negative and significant (math: r = -.43, p<.05; science: r = -.54, p<.05; reading: r = -.51, 
p<.05). Performance in PISA 2009 is not only associated with the level of confidence in 
educational systems, but also with the level of agreement among the general public. Countries 
that perform well on PISA also show high levels of agreement among the general public with 
respect to confidence in educational system. Perhaps this is related to interpretation work (by the 
media and policy makers) that is possible in countries that are ranked in the middle or the bottom 
of the PISA rankings table, but not in countries that perform well.	
4	In other model specifications (available upon request) we found that income has no effect on 
confidence in educational system. For example, we found that the bivariate coefficient is small 
and non-significant (b=.002, p=.674). 
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Compared to respondents who are employed, those who are unemployed or are not in the labor 
force show less confidence in educational system. Finally, respondents in urban communities 
show less confidence in educational system. These patterns hold even after we control for 
country-level variables (Models 2-6). 
Model 2 introduces the country-level control variables. The coefficient for economic 
development, as reflected in GDP per capita (logged), is not statistically significant. That is, 
respondents in more advanced economies are not statistically different than their counterparts in 
less advanced economies. This pattern is not surprising given that all of the countries in the 
analysis are industrialized nations with fairly advanced economies. The coefficient for Asian 
countries is not statistically significant. However, the size of the coefficient increases and 
becomes significant once we control for national performance on PISA (Models 3-6).  
Next, we assess the relationship between PISA results and public confidence in 
education. Specifically, we explore national performance in mathematics, a domain that is 
considered to be most suitable for international comparison (Husén, 1967). Looking at 
performance in the form of country average score (Model 3), the results show that performance 
on PISA in mathematics is associated with a significant increase in confidence in educational 
system (b=.009, p<.001). The effect size is relatively large (.80; see Tymms [2004] for 
discussion on the calculation of effect sizes in multilevel models). 
Model 4 includes a series of dummy variables that capture the country average score in 
relation to the OECD average score. This specification is important because the average score of 
OECD countries—the original target of PISA—is a common reference by which the media and 
policy makers assess performance on PISA. Compared to respondents in countries performing 
above the OECD average (reference category), respondents in countries performing at the OECD 
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average show less confidence in educational system (b=-.263, p<.06). A similar pattern is 
evident for respondents in countries performing below the OECD average show (b=-.552, 
p<.001). In additional analysis (available upon request) we found significant difference between 
respondents in countries performing at the OECD average and respondents in countries 
performing below the OECD average (b=-.289, p<.05).5 
Model 5 introduces national performance on PISA in the form of country ranking. 
Similar to the patterns discussed earlier, lower ranking on PISA in mathematics is associated 
with a significant decrease in confidence in educational system (b=-.026, p<.001). Finally, 
Model 6 introduces a simplified country ranking with a series of dummy variables. Respondents 
in top ten countries (the reference category) show the highest level of confidence in educational 
system. The differences between respondents in top ten countries and respondents in countries 
ranked between 11-20 is marginally significant (b=-.389, p<.08). The differences between 
respondents in top ten countries and respondents in countries ranked 21 or below is statically 
significant (b=-.699, p<.001). In additional analysis (available upon request) we found 
significant difference between respondents in top twenty countries and countries ranked 21 or 
below (-.310, p<.05). 
HLM Models with Performance in Science and Reading   
Table 4 presents HLM models of confidence in educational system and tests the effect of 
national performance on PISA in science (Models 1-4) and reading (Models 5-8) across all 30 
countries. As noted, all models include controls for individual-level and country-level variables. 
																																								 																				
5	This coefficient is easily calculated by subtracting the coefficient for the third category (below 
OECD average) from the coefficient for the second category (no difference from the OECD 
average). For example: (-.552) – (-.263) = .289.	
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For brevity, however, we remove the coefficients for these controls from the table (complete 
tables are available upon request). 
Table 4 about here 
Overall, the results for science and reading echo the patterns discussed earlier for 
mathematics. This is not surprising given that the correlations between country average scores 
are very strong (for mathematics and science: r=.94, p<.001; for mathematics and reading: r=.90, 
p<.001). Country average score in science (Model 1) and reading (Model 5) is positively 
associated with confidence in educational system. The effect size for science is modest (.54) and 
the effect size for reading is large (.71). The coefficients for the dummy variables that capture the 
country average score in relation to the OECD average score (Models 2 and 6) are also positively 
related, but they are not statistical significance for science and they are marginally significant for 
reading. A lower ranking on PISA in science (Model 3) and reading (Model 7) is associated with 
a significant decrease in confidence in educational system. Also, respondents in top ten countries 
show the highest level of confidence in educational system (Models 4 and 8).  
In summary, the HLM models show clear pattern between country performance on PISA 
and public confidence in national education systems. Respondents in high performing 
countries—measured in multiple ways—express higher levels of confidence in their educational 
system than countries with lower scores and rankings. All models account for alternative 
explanations by including controls at the individual-level and country-level.  
Supplemental Analyses 
We conducted several methodological checks on our results (available upon request). First, we 
used multilevel mixed-effects ordinal logistic regression (with melogit command in Stata) to 
ensure that our findings were not affected by the categorical nature of the outcome variable 
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(Long, 1997). Patterns were consistent across all models, suggesting that our results are not an 
artifact of using HLM technique as opposed to a categorical technique.  
Second, we introduced and additional control—confidence in health care system—to test 
the socio-psychological explanation (Newton & Norris, 2000) for formation of trust in public 
institutions. Here, we use the additional control variable as a proxy for trusting disposition or 
personality. The global bivariate correlation between confidence in health care system and 
confidence in educational system is positive and significant (r=.55, p<.001).6 The link between 
performance in PISA and confidence in educational system holds even after we account for 
confidence in health care system. Across all models, the coefficient for confidence in health care 
system was positive and significant. 
Finally, we estimated the models without Asian countries because previous research 
suggests that these countries often show low levels of confidence in institutions and high 
performance in PISA. In models with performance in mathematics, patterns were consistent in 
terms of coefficient direction and significance. In models with performance in science and 
reading, patterns were consistent in terms of coefficient direction but not in terms of significance. 
Discussion 
The past two decades witnessed an immense growth in ILSA, especially in subjects such as 
mathematics, science, and reading. In addition to the growth in the sheer number of assessments, 
scholars have documented a growing number of countries that subject their educational systems 
to the scrutiny of Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), Progress in 
																																								 																				
6	More than half of respondents (56.6 percent) reported the same level of confidence for both 
public institutions. Almost equal share of respondents reported having more confidence in 
educational system (22.7 percent) or more confidence in health care system (20.7 percent). The 
strength of the correlation vary across countries, with Russian Federation having the strongest 
correlation (r=.73, p<.001) and Switzerland having the weakest correlation (r=.36, p<.001). 	
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International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), and PISA. For example, 55 countries participated 
in the most recent cycle of TIMSS and 76 countries participated in the most recent cycle of PISA 
(both cycles were completed in 2015). Once released, results from ILSA often appear on the 
front pages of newspapers around the world, often in a form of an international league table. In 
many countries, results from ILSA ignite a public discussion about weaknesses, strengths, and 
opportunities in the educational system. 
In response to the emergence of the ILSA phenomenon, scholars have examined the 
consequences of these assessments for education policy. Drawing on news stories and policy 
documents, scholars demonstrated the ways in which policy makers and pundits (i.e., media 
outlets) engage with and respond to results of TIMSS, PIRLS, and PISA. In this article, we posit 
that in order to fully understand the political consequences of ILSA, scholars should also 
consider the perspective of the general public. This belief directed us to the main research 
question that guided this study: is there a relationship between national performance on PISA 
and public confidence in education? 
The theoretical framework for this study is informed by two lines of research. The first 
line examined public confidence in education. This line of work, which is based on samples from 
the United States and Canada, identified important individual-level control variables. The second 
line used Newton and Norris’ (2000) institutional performance model coupled with James and 
Moseley’s (2014) nascent institutional performance theory. Both expounded the hypothesis that 
people gain or lose confidence in institutions based on their performance as opposed to other 
factors. Using these hypotheses to frame our study we argued that respondents in high 
preforming countries will express higher level of trust in their respective educational system.   
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In order to test this hypothesis, we used high quality survey data from the health and 
health care module of the ISSP, which was conducted in 2011 in 30 countries. The ISSP dataset 
is hierarchically organized with individuals nested within countries, thus we used HLM 
technique. For each PISA domain (mathematics, science, and reading), we examined a series of 
models with different forms of student performance in PISA.  
 We conclude that there is initial evidence that national performance on PISA has a 
significant positive relationship to public confidence in education. Respondents in countries that 
perform well on PISA—whether measured in country average score, country average score 
relative to OECD average, ranking, and grouping by ranking (top ten, 11-20, and 21 and 
below)—show higher levels of confidence in education. While results are robust for national 
performance in mathematics (Table 3), the results for performance in science and reading are 
somewhat weaker (Table 4). All the coefficients are in the right direction, but not all of them 
reach statistical significance.  
 One possible explanation for this pattern is to consider the results of PISA, specifically 
low or disappointing results, as disrupting the “taken for granted” aspects of an educational 
system. Indeed, scholars have used the term “shock” to describe policy reactions to PISA results 
(Lingard, 2016). We speculate that in low preforming countries, the media and policy makers 
have more opportunity to interpret the quantitative results and to scandalize the educational 
system (Steiner-Khamsi, 2003). In turn, the exposure to this kind of public discourse raises 
questions on the assumed or believed quality of education in a given country. Further, ILSA 
results point to what is “educationally possible” in other contexts and may shape expectations by 
policy makers and the general public. 
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 The implications of these results are of importance to scholarship on education policy. 
They suggest that policy makers may use ILSA results to “shake” the educational system up by 
manufacturing a sense of crisis among the general public (Berliner & Biddle, 1996; Lingard, 
2016). In turn, this “shake up” will create a policy window for introducing solutions for low 
performance in ILSA (e.g., privatization, school choice, new teacher training and evaluation) and 
for the decreasing confidence in education and school (e.g., test-based accountability, national 
evaluation systems).  
Following previous research on public confidence in education, and with accordance with 
socio-psychological and socio-cultural models (Newton & Norris, 2000) for trust formation, we 
find significant relationships for key individual-level predictors. Women and parents show 
higher level of confidence in education across 30 countries. Research from the US General 
Social Survey suggests that men show higher level of confidence in most social institutions and 
the government (Smith, 2008). One exception is education where there is no significant 
difference. As for parents, the pattern might be explained by their regular contact with the 
educational system. Respondents with higher levels of education and respondents living in urban 
communities show lower level of confidence in education. Importantly, individual-level 
predictors account for less than 1% of the variation in confidence in education between 
countries.  
 Every study has limitations and our study is no different. Three limitations should be 
considered. First, the ISSP data do not include any information about media consumption habits. 
Nor does our country-level data include any information about the volume of public discourse 
(e.g., number of news articles published following the release of PISA 2010). Because 
educational attainment is often associated with media consumption and political engagement, we 
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believe that by controlling for education we address this issue to some extent. Still, future 
research should investigate the link between public discourse regarding ILSA (e.g., volume and 
content) and public opinion (for example, see: Fladmoe, 2012). Second, our study is based on 
survey data collected after more than a decade of ILSA results have been infused to the public 
discourse. Most of the countries included in the analysis began participating in ILSA in the mid-
1990s (as part of the 1995 Third International Mathematics and Science Study) and in the early 
cycles of PISA. It is likely that ILSA results had significant effect on trust in education in the 
early 2000s. In other words, it is possible that measures of trust in 2011 are shaped by ILSA 
results published beforehand. Future research could address this limitation by using survey data 
from earlier periods. Third, our study is based on one time-point (2011). Therefore, the design 
precludes any interpretation regarding the causal effect of change in ILSA results (e.g., 
improving, declining, or no change) on transformation in trust in education. It is noteworthy that 
ILSA results from the past two decades are consistent and show little change in country 
performance; thus, future research should focus on countries that demonstrated change in their 
ILSA results. One related limitation is the issue of reverse causality. Although trust in education 
is specified as the outcome variable, one could argue that trust in education explain cross-
national variation in achievement (see for example: Bryk and Schneider, 2002). Future research 
could address this limitation using time-series analysis or population-based experimental surveys 
(Mutz, 2011).  
The relationship between performance data—such as PISA—and public opinion has 
many levels of complexity that need to be considered. Future research in this area could develop 
in three ways. Quantitative research should explore changes in public opinion over time, before 
and after engagement with ILSA. Other quantitative research should extend beyond trust in 
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education to include policy preferences, such attitudes toward public spending on education or 
introduction of policies inspired by neoliberal and New Public Management approaches. 
Qualitative research should examine the ways in which the general public engages with and 
makes sense of ILSA results (e.g., what does the public discourse about these assessments mean 
to the general public?). Other qualitative research should investigate how people engage and 
consume different types of presentations of performance data (e.g., ranking tables versus 
grouping of countries, and quality measures versus equity measures).  
 In conclusion, our study provides evidence, for the first-time to our knowledge, that PISA 
results have a significant relationship to public trust in education. It contributes to the growing 
scholarly literature about ILSA by including often neglected stakeholders—members of the 
general public—who are not only the sponsors of ILSA, but also the benefactors of this policy 
tool. By doing so, this study suggests further benefits of bringing the public back to educational 
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Table 1: Metrics, Definitions, and Descriptive Stats (n=42,331) 
Variable Definition and description Mean SD 
    
Dependent variable    
Confidence in educational 
system  
In general, how much confidence do you 
have in the educational system in 
[country]?  
Reversed coded: 1=no confidence at all, 
2=very little confidence, 3=some 
confidence, 4=a great deal of confidence, 
5=complete confidence 
3.21 .93 
    
Individual-level variables    
Female 1=female, 0=male .54  
    
Age Years 47.26 16.69 
    
Age squared Years 2512.05 1650.68 
    
Parent (yes) 1=at least one child in the household,  
0=no children in the household 
.27  
    
Education    
Less than secondary school 1=yes, 0=no .33  
Secondary school 1=yes, 0=no .38  
University or higher 1=yes, 0=no .29  
    
Income Relative income based on country-
specific z-scores 
.04 1.04 
    
Employment status    
Employed 1=yes, 0=no .58  
Unemployed 1=yes, 0=no .06  
Not in labor force 1=yes, 0=no .36  
    
Community    
Urban 1=yes, 0=no .27  
Suburb / town  1=yes, 0=no .40  
Rural 1=yes, 0=no .32  
    
Country-level variables    
GDP per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita, logged 
10.23 .79 
    





Variable Definition and description Mean SD 
    
Math score Aggregate score in PISA 2009 
mathematics  
506.26 41.17 
    
Math score compared to OECD average   
Statistically above average 1=yes, 0=no .45  
No difference  1=yes, 0=no .23  
Statistically below average 1=yes, 0=no .32  
    
Math ranking Country ranking in PISA 2009 
mathematics 
21.85 13.35 
    
Math simplified ranking    
Rank: Top 10 1=yes, 0=no .23  
Rank: 11-20 1=yes, 0=no .22  
Rank: 21 and below 1=yes, 0=no .55  
    
Science score Aggregate score in PISA 2009 science 508.71 31.28 
    
Science score compared to OECD average   
Statistically above average 1=yes, 0=no .49  
No difference  1=yes, 0=no .20  
Statistically below average 1=yes, 0=no .31  
    
Science ranking Country ranking in PISA 2009 science 21.85 12.97 
    
Science simplified ranking    
Rank: Top 10 1=yes, 0=no .22  
Rank: 11-20 1=yes, 0=no .21  
Rank: 21 and below 1=yes, 0=no .57  
    
Reading score Aggregate score in PISA 2009 reading 504.47 32.94 
    
Reading score compared to OECD average   
Statistically above average 1=yes, 0=no .40  
No difference  1=yes, 0=no .28  
Statistically below average 1=yes, 0=no .32  
    
Reading ranking Country ranking in PISA 2009 reading 20.99 13.39 
    
Reading simplified ranking    
Rank: Top 10 1=yes, 0=no .25  
Rank: 11-20 1=yes, 0=no .24  
Rank: 21 and below 1=yes, 0=no .51  
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Table 2: Confidence in Educational System and Performance in PISA  
Country N 
Confidence in 
education Score Ranking 
 
 Mean SD Math Science Reading Math Science Reading 
Australia 1,624 3.09 .81 514.34 527.27 514.90 15 10 9 
Belgium 2,563 3.56 .75 515.27 506.58 505.95 14 21 11 
Bulgaria 894 2.98 1.10 428.07 439.29 429.08 46 46 46 
Chile 1,287 2.59 .93 421.06 447.47 449.37 49 44 44 
China 4,045 3.60 .91 600.08 574.62 555.83 1 1 1 
Chinese Taipei 1,024 2.52 1.00 543.18 520.42 495.24 5 12 23 
Croatia 1,087 3.16 .89 459.94 486.36 475.75 40 37 36 
Czech Republic 1,592 3.23 .96 492.81 500.50 478.19 27 24 34 
Denmark 1,288 3.65 .68 503.28 499.34 494.92 19 26 24 
Finland 1,238 3.93 .65 540.50 554.08 535.88 6 2 3 
France 2,712 2.99 .70 496.78 498.23 495.62 22 27 22 
Germany 1,567 3.34 .84 512.78 520.41 497.31 16 13 20 
Israel 1,059 2.97 1.04 487.14 507.98 495.64 32 20 21 
Italy 1,006 2.90 .83 482.91 488.83 486.05 35 35 29 
Japan 1,108 2.65 .72 528.99 539.43 519.86 9 5 8 
Korea 1,306 2.88 .92 546.23 537.99 539.27 4 6 2 
Lithuania 1,035 2.91 .83 476.60 491.41 468.44 37 33 40 
Netherlands 1,283 3.21 .74 525.84 522.22 508.40 11 11 10 
Norway 1,595 3.71 .68 497.96 499.88 503.23 21 25 12 
Poland 1,014 2.89 .82 494.80 508.07 500.48 25 19 15 
Portugal 906 2.91 .85 486.89 492.95 489.33 33 32 27 
Russian Federation 1,281 2.97 1.12 467.81 478.30 459.40 38 39 43 
Slovak Republic 1,072 3.54 .95 496.68 490.27 477.44 23 34 35 
Slovenia 957 3.44 .83 501.47 511.76 483.08 20 17 31 
Spain 2,169 3.14 .96 483.49 488.25 481.04 34 36 33 
Sweden 920 3.30 .80 494.24 495.11 497.45 26 29 19 
Switzerland 1,136 3.59 .74 533.96 516.57 500.50 8 15 14 
Turkey 1,308 3.26 1.21 445.45 453.91 464.19 43 43 41 
United Kingdom 815 3.06 .77 492.41 513.71 494.18 28 16 25 
United States 1,440 3.05 .82 487.40 502.00 499.83 31 23 17 





Table 3: Hierarchical Linear Models of Confidence in Educational System, by Country 
Performance in PISA in Mathematics (n=42,331) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Individual-level variables      
Female .028** .028** .028** .028** .028** .028** 
 (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) 
       
Age -.009*** -.009*** -.009*** -.009*** -.009*** -.009*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
       
Age squared .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
       
Parent (yes) .081*** .081*** .081*** .081*** .081*** .081*** 
 (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) 
       
Education       
Secondary  -.095*** -.095*** -.095*** -.095*** -.095*** -.095*** 
education (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) 
       
University degree  -.052*** -.052*** -.052*** -.052*** -.052*** -.052*** 
or higher (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) 
       
Income .004 .004 .004 .004 .004 .004 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
       
Employment status       
Unemployed -.080*** -.080*** -.080*** -.079*** -.079*** -.080*** 
 (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) 
       
Out of labor force -.037*** -.037*** -.037** -.037*** -.037*** -.037*** 
 (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) 
       
Community       
Suburb/town  .038*** .038*** .038*** .038*** .038*** .038*** 
 (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) 
       
Rural .090*** .090*** .090*** .090*** .089*** .090*** 
 (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) 
       
Country-level variables      
GDP per capita  .100 -.074 -.073 -.159* -.030 
  (.082) (.070) (.081) (.078) (.078) 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Asian countries  -.252 -.880*** -.616*** -.927*** -.870*** 
  (.171) (.178) (.172) (.180) (.244) 
       
Math score   .009***    
   (.002)    
       
Math score compared to OECD average     
No difference     -.263+   
    (.137)   
       
Below    -.552***   
    (.143)   
       
Math ranking     -.026***  
     (.005)  
       
Simplified ranking       
Rank 11-20      -.389+ 
      (.216) 
       
Rank 21 and       -.699*** 
below      (.211) 
       
       
Random components       
Level-1 variance .866 .863 .863 .863 .863 .863 
Level-2 variance .338 .335 .230 .227 .261 .255 
Intraclass correlation 
coefficient (ICC) 
.131 .116 .066 .064 .083 .080 
Percentage of change 
in ICC compared with 
the null model 
.8% 12.1% 50.0% 51.5% 37.1% 39.4% 
       
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Constants are not shown. Reference groups for: Education 
– less than secondary school, employment status – employed, community – urban. 






Table 4: Hierarchical Linear Models of Confidence in Educational System, by Country 
Performance in PISA in Science and Reading (n=42,331) 
 PISA Performance in Science PISA Performance in Reading 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 
4 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Score .008***    .010***    
 (.002)    (.003)    
         
Score compared to OECD average       
No difference  .029    -.306*   
  (.165)    (.136)   
         
Below  -.239    -.303+   
  (.151)    (.170)   
         
Ranking   -.015**    -.017**  
   (.006)    (.006)  
         
Simplified ranking         
Rank 11-20    -.370+    -.094 
    (.195)    (.186) 
         
Rank 21 and     -.356+    -.343* 
Below    (.199)    (.166) 
         
         
Random components        
Level-1 variance .863 .863 .863 .863 .863 .863 .863 .863 
Level-2 variance .264 .299 .283 .295 .258 .287 .272 .287 
Intraclass correlation 
coefficient (ICC) 
.086 .107 .097 .104 .082 .099 .090 .099 
Percentage of change 
in ICC compared 
with the null model 
34.8% 18.9% 26.5% 21.5% 37.9% 25.0% 31.8% 25.0% 
         
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Constants are not shown. All models include controls for: 
Gender, age, age squared, parental status, education, income, employment status, community, 
GDP per capita, and Asian countries. Reference groups for: Education – less than secondary 
school, employment status – employed, community – urban. 
+ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
